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t  the  Saint  Petersburg  Summit  in  2003,  the  EU  and  the  Russian  Federation
1  established  a  new 
institutional and non-legally binding setting to reinforce their cooperation, with the launch of four 
Common Spaces. Among them is a Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, which has 
framed the EU-Russia cooperation on justice, liberty and security (JLS) ever since. Specific measures are 
outlined in the Road Map for the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice,
2 agreed two years later 
at the EU-Russia Moscow Summit in 2005. In addition, EU-Russia JLS cooperation has developed in line 
with the multiannual EU programmes outlining the priorities in the EU JLS policy areas. In this respect, the 
Stockholm Programme (2009-2014) has particularly stressed the external dimension of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ) and the EU-Russia strategic partnership.
3 Finally, with the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009, the European Parliament has strengthened its role in external action, in 
particular by giving its assent to the signature of EU international agreements. The Treaty has also reinforced 
the fundamental human rights framework at the EU level, with the legally binding character of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the EU's accession to the European Convention  on Human Rights (ECHR), of 
which Russia is a party.  
In this context, the Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) has become the main framework for EU-Russia 
JLS relations. Cooperation has borne fruit so far with inter alia the conclusion of Readmission and Visa 
Facilitation Agreements (VFAs), as well as those on operational border-management cooperation between 
FRONTEX  and  the  Russian  Federal  Border  Guard  Service.  Nevertheless,  the  respective  operational 
arrangements with Europol and Eurojust have not been signed yet and the dialogue on visa liberalisation has 
progressed slowly. In spite of the growing network of professional contacts, meetings and consultations, 
commitments made in the Road Map have not been completely fulfilled and have so far led to scarce results 
in some policy areas. 
Against this background, this study provides up-to-date evidence  of the state  of play in EU-Russia JLS 
cooperation from the perspective of both the EU and Russia, an approach that has not been adopted so far in 
this  profoundly  under-researched  area.  It  aims  at  providing  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  EU  and  Russia’s 
approaches to the Road Map, highlighting both actors’ positions in implementing the Road Map, in order to 
assess elements underlying the lack of apparent results of EU-Russia cooperation in the framework of the 
Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice. First, this study assesses progress in the most relevant 
policy areas in the field of JLS and whether there is a balance between policy areas related to freedom and 
justice, on the one hand, and security on the other. Second, the study also looks at the shortcomings of the 
EU-Russia institutional cooperation structures, with a particular view on the new institutional settings in the 
EU since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Third, the lack of mutual trust between the parties is 
analysed as an element preventing the cooperation needed to move forward. Finally, the limited human rights 
cooperation between the EU and Russia is assessed in detail. The main argument for lack of progress in 
certain policy areas is the strategic use of political conditionality by the EU, the legitimacy of which is 
contested  by  Russia.  Still,  the  study  identifies  socialisation  as  the  policy  instrument  to  help  step  up 
cooperation under the Road Map. The analysis shows that the application of socialisation has proven to be 
effective, i.e. with progress made in the policy areas where it has been applied. The study explains how 
socialisation measures fit into EU-Russia cooperation and how they can contribute to overcoming the current 
lack of trust between the parties. Finally, the study proposes a set of policy recommendations to the LIBE 
Committee for playing a more active role in EU-Russia JLS cooperation.  
Methodologically,  the  study  is  complemented  by  fieldwork  (interviews  of  officials  involved  in  JLS 
cooperation) and is structured as follows. First, it presents an account of the normative and institutional 
                                                   
1 Hereafter referred to as ‘Russia’. On the general framework of EU-Russia relations, see Averre (2005) and Haukkala 
(2010).  
2 Hereafter referred to as the ‘Road Map’.  
3 See Wolff, Wichmann and Mounier (2009) for a comprehensive overview of the external dimension of the EU policies 
on justice, freedom and security. 
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framework of EU-Russia JLS cooperation. Second, it analyses the implementation of the main policy areas 
in JLS cooperation, including such crosscutting challenges as asylum and ensuring data protection standards. 
Third, it assesses the intersection of the Road Map with the cooperation on human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law. In this sense, the EU and Russia have established that cooperation on human rights would be the 
basis of EU-Russia JLS cooperation. Finally, the study summarises the main conclusions of the analysis and 
presents policy recommendations.   
 1 
Russia and the Common Space on Freedom, Security 
and Justice 
Raül Hernández i Sagrera and Olga Potemkina
* 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 54/February 2013 
 
1.  Cooperation between the EU and Russia in Justice, Liberty and Security: 
Normative and Institutional Framework 
KEY FINDINGS 
  The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) entered into force in 1997 and constitutes the EU-
Russia legally binding framework for cooperation.  
  The Road Map for the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, launched in 2005, has so far 
been the main document to set out the EU-Russia JLS agenda, regardless of its non-legally binding 
nature. 
  Both parties opted to include socialisation as a policy instrument to step up their cooperation in the 
PCA.  
  The sub-committee format would provide for a more structured venue, where the relevant ministerial 
representatives would meet on a regular basis.  
  The Nicosia PPC meeting in October 2012 agreed to set up senior officials’ meetings (SOMs) that 
cover the  full spectrum  of JLS cooperation  once a  year, with the participation  of the  highest  non-
political representatives. 
  The  EU-Russia  New  Agreement  will  be  the  first  legally  binding  framework  that  regulates  JLS 
cooperation comprehensively, with the challenge of providing a more coherent institutional setting. In 
addition, the EU is adjusting the coordination of all the post-Treaty of Lisbon actors in the field of 
external action. 
 
This section looks briefly at the normative basis that the EU and Russia have established for cooperating in 
the AFSJ, ranging from the PCA, which entered into force in 1997, to the commitments set out in the Road 
Map for the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice. Second, it focuses on negotiations on an EU-
Russia New Agreement and the challenges underlying the current institutional setting in EU-Russia JLS 
relations.
4  
The first document to set  out a JLS agenda between the EU and Russia was the PCA, (Council  of the 
European Union, 1997). The PCA established a ‘strategic partnership’ between the EU and Russia. In this 
sense, the Stockholm Programme, the multiannual programme that sets out the EU’s priorities for action in 
the JLS sphere for 2010-2014, states that Russia is a strategic partner of the Union (European Council, 2010, 
                                                   
* Raül Hernández i Sagrera is Research Fellow at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals. Dr. Olga Potemkina is 
Head of European Integration Studies at the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences. This study has been 
carried out under coordination of the Justice and Home Affairs section of the Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS). The authors would like to express their gratitude to Dr. Sergio Carrera and Prof. Elspeth Guild for their 
comments in earlier versions of the study. They are also grateful to Dr Steven Blockmans (CEPS) and Dr Michael 
Emerson (CEPS) for their review and inputs. 
4 On the EU-Russia New Agreement, see Emerson, Tassinari and Vahl (2006).  2  HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA & POTEMKINA 
 
p. 35). The PCA includes a special title VIII devoted to counteracting unlawful activities. First, it mentions 
the prevention of “illegal activities”,
5 by readmitting irregular migrants to their countries of origin, fighting 
forgery,  corruption  and  drug  trafficking.  Second,  it  makes  reference  to  assistance  in  “drafting  national 
legislation” against unlawful activities, which is a rather ambiguous provision given that it does not clarify 
the contents of this legislation. Third, the PCA includes socialisation measures, such as the training of staff 
from both parties working mainly in law enforcement authorities. It is worth mentioning that both parties 
opted for socialisation as a policy instrument to step up their cooperation. Lastly, the agreement foresees a 
provision on visa policy, targeted at businessmen, key personnel and cross-border sellers, stipulating that 
when issuing their visas, more favourable conditions should apply.  
At the EU-Russia Saint Petersburg Summit in 2003, both actors designed a new institutional and also non-
legally binding setting to reinforce their cooperation, with the launch of four Common Spaces (EU-Russia 
Saint Petersburg Summit, 2003). Among them were the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, 
with specific measures to be found in a Road Map agreed two years later at the EU-Russia Moscow Summit 
in 2005 (EU-Russia Moscow Summit, 2005).
6 Regardless of its non-legally binding nature, it has so far been 
the main document setting out the EU-Russia JLS agenda. The New Agreement, which will include a whole 
chapter devoted to JLS issues, will be the reference document in EU-Russia JLS cooperation.  
After  this  overview  of  the  normative  basis  of  EU-Russia  JLS  cooperation,  a  few  considerations  on  the 
institutional  framework  of  EU-Russia  relations  are  highlighted.  The  EU-Russia  New  Basic  Agreement, 
which the EU and Russia have been  negotiating since 2007  with  eleven rounds  of  negotiations, should 
provide an enhanced legal basis for cooperation in the JLS sphere. The JLS chapter has already been agreed, 
but the parties have not reached an agreement on trade and investments, which prevents the New Agreement 
from being signed.
7 Once it comes into force, the New Agreement will be the first comprehensive legal basis 
to  regulate  EU-Russia  JLS  cooperation,  setting  out  legally  binding  commitments  that  will  most  likely 
enhance cooperation in the field. 
A major aspect that the New Agreement will regulate is a new institutional framework. Neither the EU-
Russia  cooperation  councils  foreseen  in  the  PCA,  nor  the  sub-committees  on  JLS  have  taken  place  in 
practice. Instead, the PPC has been institutionalised as the framework to cooperate on JLS. Although the EU-
Russia PCAs on JLS issues have counted with the participation of the Ministries of the Interior and Justice of 
Russia, as  well  as  Commissioners  Viviane  Reding  and  Cecilia  Malmström  from  the  EU  side,  the  sub-
committee format would provide for a more structured venue where the relevant ministerial representatives 
could meet on a regular basis. In addition, the Nicosia JLS PPC in October 2012 went a step further from the 
current situation, stating that “[t]he Parties agreed to hold one PPC on Freedom, Security and Justice per 
year. To ensure continuity of the work between PPC meetings, the Parties agreed to hold an SOM in line 
with  the  implementation  of  the  EU-Russia  Partnership  and  Cooperation  Agreement”  (Council  of  the 
European Union, 2012a, p. 3). The initiative consists of setting up SOM meetings that cover all of JLS 
cooperation, with the participation of the highest non-political representatives. Such general SOM meetings 
take place in the framework of EU-US JLS cooperation. SOM meetings already take place in specific policy 
areas,  such  as  the  EU-Russia  visa  dialogue,  which  from  the  EU  side  are  chaired  by  the  Commission 
Directorate-General for Home Affairs and from the Russian side by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the 
Joint Readmission and Visa Facilitation Committees. 
At this point, it is important to recall that as a consequence of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
EU is adjusting at the internal level those institutions responsible for external action in the field of JLS. The 
actors involved are the  new body responsible  for overall  external action, the European External  Action 
Service (EEAS), the Commission services in charge of the external dimensions of home affairs and justice, 
the  Presidency  of  the  Council  and  the  EU  member  states.  Home  affairs  agencies,  such  as  FRONTEX, 
                                                   
5 The term ‘illegal migration’ was widely used by the EU institutions at the time the PCA entered into force. However, 
the neutral term ‘irregular migration’ has progressively replaced it. The contribution of civil society and academia has 
been key to changing the use of one term for the other.  
6 See Potemkina (2010) for an assessment of the implementation of the Road Map.  
7 Based on an interview with an official from the European External Action Service. RUSSIA AND THE COMMON SPACE ON FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE  3 
Europol and Eurojust, also have their own external relations officers who deal with Russia. The EU faces the 
challenge of inter-service coordination and more time is needed so that the new institutional structures of the 
Treaty of Lisbon become fully operational. All in all, according to an official from the EEAS, the challenge 
of the New Agreement is to set up new structures that allow for more effective cooperation between Brussels 
and Moscow.  
2.  Main Issues and Challenges Underlying the Implementation of the EU-Russia 
Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice 
KEY FINDINGS 
  The visa-free dialogue has become a crucial issue in EU-Russia JLS cooperation, overshadowing other 
significant spheres of the common space, as it can be considered ‘a litmus test’ for the level of mutual 
trust.  
  The Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel consist of actions in four key areas covering all 
the main aspects of JLS policy and connecting the loose patchwork of JLS cooperation. 
  The  state  of  play  reveals  the  difference  in  the  approaches  of  the  EU  and  Russia  towards  visa 
liberalisation: while Brussels insists on the technical character of the existing obstacles to a visa-free 
regime,  Moscow  states  that  the  technical  requirements  have  been  met  and  stresses  the  political 
component of the EU decision not to lift short-term visas in the nearest future.  
  The implementation of the EU-Russia Readmission Agreement can be regarded as a success story and 
among the less problematic issues in EU-Russia cooperation.  
  EU-Russia cooperation on drugs is assessed as more problematic than successful. In spite of intensive 
activities against illicit drug trafficking, no steps have been taken in exerting joint consolidated pressure 
upon the trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan.  
  The  lack  of  an  independent  body  to  control  information  exchange  in  Russia  is  slowing  down  the 
progress of negotiations on the operational Working Arrangements with Europol and Eurojust, which is 
a precondition for the liberalisation of the visa regime. 
 
This  section  analyses  the  degree  of  implementation  of  the  Road  Map,  its  main  results,  challenges  and 
failures. The last publicly available Progress Report on the Road Map is for 2010 (European Union–Russia, 
2011), although an evaluation in 2011 was also issued.
8 The structure is developed in accordance with the 
importance of the issues under examination and their place on the EU-Russia political agenda, starting from 
the dialogue towards visa-free short-term travel, which is crucial in EU-Russia JLS relations, and ending 
with judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, which despite its relevance lacks momentum. The 
section looks at the  main issues at stake,  which are  logically  interlinked, by  examining the  most recent 
developments in EU-Russia JLS consultations and meetings at the different levels. The analysis shows the 
uneven progress in fulfilling the commitments set in the Road Map. It is important to understand why a 
number of the commitments in the Road Map are being implemented rather smoothly, while others stagnate, 
in spite of the fact that the main preparations for achieving the results have been accomplished. The objective 
and subjective reasons for the success and failure of the implementation of the Road Map are exposed, as 
well as the reasons for (mis)communications and (dis)trust between the parties. It is obvious that the lack of 
trust at the level of EU-Russia political contacts constrains the enhancement of cooperation in JLS issues.  
                                                   
8 It must be recalled that access to documents on EU-Russia relations is not fully transparent, as numerous documents 
are not publicly available and many of them are only partially accessible to the public. 4  HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA & POTEMKINA 
 
2.1  The dialogue on visa-free short-term travel and the Visa Facilitation Agreement 
The Joint Statement of the Saint Petersburg Summit reaffirmed the importance of people-to-people contacts 
and a “Europe without dividing lines”, which was translated into a specific measure in the Road Map: the 
establishment of a visa-free regime in the long-term. The Road Map explicitly states that “it was also decided 
to  examine the conditions for visa-free travel as a long-term perspective” (EU-Russia Moscow Summit, 
2005, p. 20). Actually, visa liberalisation was one of the main issues during the Saint Petersburg Summit, 
since  Russia  asked  the  EU  for  a  clear  and  tangible  incentive  to  go  further  with  the  negotiations  on  a 
Readmission Agreement. To be sufficiently persuasive, this incentive had to be necessarily related to the 
facilitation of the movement of people between the EU and Russia. In this sense, it must be recalled that 
Russia, unlike the EU, was eager to abolish the visa regime at the time of the negotiations. Therefore, in the 
absence doing so in the short term, the incentive proposed was a facilitation of the issuance of visas. This 
section delves into the implementation of and prospects for the common steps towards visa-free short-term 
travel, the renegotiation of the VFA and the Kaliningrad regime for local border traffic (LBT).  
2.1.1  Implementation of the common steps towards visa-free short-term travel 
The  EU-Russia  visa  dialogue  SOMs  were  launched  in  September  2007  as  a  framework  for  the  visa 
liberalisation process. Regarding the grounds on which the visa regime should be abolished, the EU and 
Russia have opted for an approach whereby technical requirements should be adopted by both parties. At the 
EU-Russia Summit in December 2011, the list of mutual commitments or Common Steps towards visa-free 
short-term travel was adopted and regrettably not made publicly available. It seems that the EU will seek 
publication of the commitments set out in the Common Steps at the EU-Russia Summit on 21 December 
2012 if member states agree to do so in the Council. Russia presumably has no objections to the publication 
of the Common Steps.
9  
The Common Steps, unlike the existing Road Maps on Visa Liberalisation that the EU unilaterally adopted 
for the Eastern Partnership countries (Ukraine and Moldova to date), are expected to commit both sides on 
the basis of reciprocity. Concerning the legal form the reciprocal abolition of the visa regime should adopt 
once the Common Steps are fulfilled, the parties will sign an international Visa Waiver Agreement, which 
will also provide more legal certainty on compliance with their obligations. 
Ambassador  Vladimir  Chizhov,  Permanent  Representative  of  the  Russia  to  the  EU,  called  the  visa-free 
dialogue  “a  touchstone  determining  the  faithfulness  of  the  partners’  intention  to  develop  a  strategic 
partnership  for  modernisation”,  as  visa-free  travel  concerns  the  interests  of  many  citizens:  2.5  million 
Russians visit the Schengen Area annually and 1.5 million citizens from the Schengen Area go to Russia.
10 
The statistics show the extensive travel exchange between Russia and the Schengen Area. According to data 
from  the  European  Commission,  in  2011  Russia  was  among  the  countries  where  most  short-stay  visa 
applications were lodged (5.2 million, 39% of the total), with the highest rate of multi-entry visas issued 
(47%) and a very low refusal rate (2%).
11 The statistics of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) of Russia 
show that in 2011 Germany was second (after China) in the list of states whose citizens received Russian 
visas (10%), followed by France (5%), Finland (4%), Italy (4%) the UK (3%) and Lithuania (3%).
12  
For the purpose of preparing the report on the implementation of the Common Steps for the EU-Russia 
Summit on 21 December 2012, the visa dialogue SOM in January 2012 agreed on a monthly schedule to 
monitor progress in the implementation. According to the agreed schedule, the first expert meeting took 
place  in  April  2012,  where  the  parties  discussed  the  necessary  arrangements  for  the  fulfilment  of  the 
Common Steps, including the legal base and measures to be implemented in every element of the Common 
                                                   
9 Based on an interview with an EEAS official.  
10 See Chizhov (2012). It is very significant that Russia speaks about “visa-free dialogue” in official documents and 
rhetoric, while the EU calls it “visa dialogue”. 
11  European  Commission,  “Overview  of  Schengen  Visa  statistics  2009-2011”,  Directorate-General  Home  Affairs, 
Directorate B: Immigration and asylum, Unit B.3: Visa Policy, Brussels (2012), p. 4. 
12 RF FMS (2012), p. 8. RUSSIA AND THE COMMON SPACE ON FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE  5 
Steps: “documents security, including biometric passports”, “irregular migration, including readmission”, 
“public order protection, law enforcement and legal cooperation”, including the Russia-Europol Strategic 
and  Operational  Agreement,  and  finally  “external  relations  and  fundamental  rights”.  In  addition,  the 
exchange of expert missions was agreed as well as the reports on implementation. Russia submitted its report 
(219 pages) in April 2012 and the EU did so in June 2012. The reports were discussed during the SOM in 
June  2012  in  Brussels.  The  first  expert  field  mission  on  document  security  went  to  Moscow  on  24-28 
September. The second EU mission (28 November-8 December) inspected the Russian-Belarusian border 
and cross-border points between Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Russian experts plan a return visit to the 
EU on 10-20 December. 
A number of issues had already been tackled in summer 2012, such as the issuance of biometric passports 
that are compliant with the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). These contain 
a chip  with  information as  well as a procedure  of  information transfer for stolen  or lost documents. In 
addition, the EU’s concern about the obligation of foreigners’ registration in Russia would be addressed by 
Russia with the following proposal: once the Visa Waiver Agreement enters into force, registration for short 
visits will be cancelled in both Russia and the EU member states where it is required.  
In October 2012, the EU-Russia PPC in Nicosia welcomed the continuing implementation of the Common 
Steps in its joint conclusions (see Council of the European Union, 2012a). At the same time, Alexander 
Konovalov, the head of the Russian delegation at the PPC, noted that the negotiations returned to the results 
that had been already achieved four years ago.
13 The visa-free regime became the key issue during the EU-
Russia Summit on 21 December 2012. The situation seemed rather strained and controversial on the eve of 
the summit. Russia, being dissatisfied with the slow pace of implementing the Common Steps, offered a 
Road Map for quicker progress: to implement measures fulfilling the first and the second elements of the 
Common Steps (on document security and irregular migration) by the end of 2012 and to continue work on 
the third and the fourth ones in 2013 with the aim of finalising them by the EU-Russia summit in June 2013, 
in order to proceed with the drafting of the Visa Waiver Agreement.  
According to this schedule, the Agreement might be signed at the end of 2013 and a visa-free regime enacted 
before the winter 2014 Sochi Olympics. As for the EU, Brussels has several technical problems with the 
implementation  of  the  Common  Steps,  which  have  not  been  addressed  by  Russia:  border  management 
(technical capabilities at checkpoints) and corruption, which are connected with document security. With 
serious doubts on the EU side that the problems could be solved during a year, the “visa lifting process is at 
the very beginning” and it is “untimely to speak about any dates”.
14  
The state of play reveals the difference in the approaches of the two sides: while Brussels insists on the 
technical character of the obstacles to a visa-free regime, Moscow believes that the technical requirements 
have  been  met,  and  the  real  reasons  of  the  EU  are  mainly  political.  In  this  regard,  Anwar  Asimov, 
Ambassador at Large, cited the intention of several EU member states to first lift visas with the Eastern 
Partnership  countries,
15  the  opposition  by  certain  Central  European  and  Baltic  member  states  to  the 
liberalisation and the EU’s persistence in emphasising the human rights component of the visa liberalisation 
process.
16 At the same time, Ambassador Azimov mentioned that Moscow may take measures if there is no 
breakthrough in the visa-free dialogue with the EU before the end of 2013. “It is hard to put Russians under a 
yoke – and then the strike [back] will be adequate and asymmetric”, he added, according to Interfax.
17 
The  EU-Russia  Summit  on  21  December  2012  brought  no  positive  results  to  the  urgent  issues  under 
discussion. It is clear that the implementation of the Common Steps has not facilitated the level of trust 
needed to lift visas yet. Nevertheless, Russia has at the moment no intention of unilaterally stopping the 
                                                   
13 ITAR-TASS News Agency, 03.10.2012. 
14 See Ambassador Azimov’s interview by the Interfax News Agency, Kommersant-daily, 28.11.2012. 
15 Given that the EU has been developing the visa dialogue in parallel with Ukraine and Moldova, Russia is against an 
eventual earlier lifting of the visas in Ukraine and Moldova, as it considers that this would be a political decision. 
However, Moscow accepts the possibility of reaching the visa-free regime at the same time. 
16 PNA/Itar-Tass News Agency, 29.11.2012. 
17 Moscow Times, “Russia threatens EU with retaliation”, 27 November 2012.  6  HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA & POTEMKINA 
 
adoption of the Common Steps. Actually, the Russian Ministry of Culture is engaged in drafting legislation 
to liberalise visas for participants and spectators of business, cultural, sport and other official events, who 
come to Russia for no more than ten days. The decision on the further development of the visa dialogue 
might be taken during the EU-Russia summit in June 2013. 
To sum up, mixed results have been achieved so far in the EU-Russia visa dialogue. Two elements of the 
Common Steps have been implemented by the EU-Russia summit on 21 December: document security and 
irregular migration. Russia is indicating its willingness to address the EU’s concerns on border management, 
corruption and foreigners’ registration. The following six months will be devoted to addressing the most 
critical problems. The EU’s reluctance to fix a date for starting the negotiations on a Visa Waiver Agreement 
causes disappointment and irritation on the Russian side and decreases significantly the progress of the visa-
free  dialogue.  By  contrast,  a  fixed  date  would  be  a  great  incentive  and  encouragement  for  Russia  to 
overcome problems and shortcomings. 
In this context, the implementation of technical preconditions to which the parties committed in the Common 
Steps should be separated from political conditionality, which puts human rights as the  main aspect for 
progress towards visa liberalisation. Russia shows readiness to  implement all the technical requirements 
under the respected list, but rejects progress in human rights and democracy as the key precondition for 
establishing visa-free travel and insists on including human rights issues in the implementation process only 
to the extent they directly touch on the liberalisation of visas, such as anti-discrimination laws.  
Why may conditionality not only turn out to be ineffective but also counterproductive? Conditionality is a 
policy instrument that is most plausible when there is an EU membership prospect and when sanctions are 
justified in relation to a repressive political regime. In the Russian case, unlike the Eastern Partnership states, 
Russia  does  not  emphasise  ‘the  European  choice’;  it  agrees  to  accept  acquis  communautaire  ‘where 
appropriate’, and positions itself as an  equal partner vis-à-vis the  Union. Thus the  golden carrot of EU 
membership does not attract Russia. As for the possible sanctions, Russia does not consider them a serious 
threat  and  speaks  regularly  about  an  asymmetrical  response.  Consequently,  the  most  effective  policy 
instrument in EU-Russian relations appears to be that of socialisation, as opposed to that of conditionality. 
Visa  liberalisation  and  increasing  youth  exchanges  would  foster  people-to-people  contacts,  which  can 
become  the  motor  of  socialisation,  increase  the  knowledge  and  deeper  understanding  of  both  sides  and 
finally support EU-Russian common values. Increasing business and professional contacts through meetings 
and consultations and joint training programmes inter alia for judges, police officers and border guards are 
another means of socialisation, which contribute to building mutual trust among the parties. These would be 
the most effective countermeasures to boost the modernisation and democratising pressures within Russia. 
Meanwhile,  visa  restrictions  are  generally  felt  to  be  humiliating  by  virtue  of  their  intrusiveness,  heavy 
bureaucratic delays, costs and uncertain outcomes. The current visa obligations and the EU’s reluctance to 
lift Schengen visas give way to an increase of anti-European sentiments in Russia, thus feeding nationalistic 
rhetoric. 
2.1.2  Progress in the renegotiation of the Visa Facilitation Agreement 
The Visa Facilitation Agreement between the EU and Russia entered into force in 2007 (Council of the 
European Union, 2007a) and was the first one to be negotiated and signed in parallel with the Readmission 
Agreement, in what has been coined as the readmission-visa facilitation nexus (Hernández i Sagrera, 2009, p. 
578).  The  VFA  entailed  the  exemption  of  visa  fees  for  certain  categories  of  visa  applicants,  such  as 
researchers and lorry drivers, a reduced, fixed visa fee for the rest of the applicants and a shorter period for 
the issuance along with the possibility to lodge applications for multiple entry visas. The assessment of the 
visa facilitation regime is rather positive, according to officials from both the EU and Russia, but rather 
negative  in  the  opinion  of  visa  applicants,  who  encounter  problems  in  the  visa  issuance  procedure. 
Nonetheless, with the enactment of the so-called ‘EU Visa Code’, the EU Regulation regarding the issuance 
of Schengen visas, the VFA would need to be amended accordingly. The European Commission has the 
mandate from the Council to renegotiate the Agreement. 
The amended VFA, which has almost been agreed at the end of 2012, foresees the liberalisation of visas for 
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the facilitation of the visa procedure for the remaining applicants subject to the regime. At the beginning of 
the negotiations, the Russian side proposed to include a provision extending the liberalisation of visas to 
holders of service passports. In this sense, similar provisions are included in the VFAs with Ukraine and 
Moldova. The proposal was not backed by the EU, however. When preparing the Nicosia PPC in October 
2012,  the  sides  started  discussing  compromise  solutions,  which  could  overcome  a  deadlock  to  the 
negotiations on an amended VFA. One proposed solution was to limit the scope of service passport holders 
to those who possess passports with an electronic data carrier and to reduce the number of passport holders 
by  excluding the  military and the administrative staff from  diplomatic representations.  Although Russia 
agreed to accept both, the compromise was not reached and the Agreement has not been amended yet.  
The lack of a compromise solution on the Agreement had direct repercussions on airline crew members, who 
used to benefit from visa liberalisation under the current VFA. The respective moratorium was not prolonged 
by Moscow on 1 November 2012 as a response to the refusal of the EU to include service passport holders in 
the  amended  VFA.  Instead,  Russia  can  sign  bilateral  agreements  with  certain  member  states  on  visa 
liberalisation for airline crew members. Still, failure to sign the amended VFA is symbolic in EU-Russia JLS 
relations, as it demonstrates the lack of flexibility even in a specific policy area. The EU distrust of even a 
relatively  small  group  –  service  passports  holders  –  makes  the  very  prospect  of  a  visa-free  regime 
questionable and slows down progress in implementing the Road Map. The EU should assess how to address 
this obstacle to the signature of an amended VFA.  
2.1.3  Kaliningrad regime for local border traffic 
Local  border  traffic  is  regulated  by  the  EU  Local  Border  Traffic  Regulation  (European  Parliament  and 
Council of the European Union, 2006) and became a special issue in the agenda of the tenth EU-Russia PPC, 
which was held in Kaliningrad in May 2009. Two years later, the initiative of Poland – which held the EU 
Presidency in the second half of 2011 – led to the signature of an agreement. On 14 December 2011, Russia 
and Poland signed the bilateral agreement on LBT, which entered into force on 27 July 2012. The Agreement 
enables residents of the border regions to cross the border with special permits, which cost €20 and are 
issued  by  the  Russian  consulates  in  Warsaw  and  Gdansk  and  the  Polish  consulate  in  Kaliningrad.  The 
document can be used for making family, social, economic, cultural and other contacts, but not for work or 
business  activities.  The  new  cross-border  regime  covers  the  entire  Kaliningrad  oblast  and  the  Polish 
Województwo (provinces) Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Pomorskie.
18 
A similar Russian-Norwegian agreement on LBT entered into force in May 2012 and was signed by the 
ministers for foreign affairs of the two countries in November 2010. The Russian-Norwegian Agreement 
covered the small border area foreseen in the EU Local Border Traffic Regulation. Actually, the prescribed 
radius of the local traffic zone proved quite convenient for travellers. But in the case of Kaliningrad, the 
Polish initiative proposed the extension of the area to the entire oblast. Therefore, it required the revision of 
the EU LBT Regulation. Given that Kaliningrad’s geographical location is unique, the EU showed flexibility 
in extending Poland and Russia’s proposal from a radius of 30 km (50 km in exceptional cases) to stretch the 
LBT area to up to 60-100 km for both Russian and Polish border areas with the goal “to prevent an artificial 
division of the Kaliningrad oblast, whereby some inhabitants would enjoy facilitations for local border traffic 
while the majority (including the inhabitants of the city of Kaliningrad) would not” (European Parliament 
and  Council  of  the  European  Union,  2011,  p.  41).  The  Polish  Consul  General  to  Kaliningrad,  Marek 
Golkowsky, acknowledged the uniqueness of the Polish-Russian Agreement.
19  
The Polish initiative was perceived in Russia as one of a few visible results of cooperation under the Road 
Map  and  across  all  EU-Russia  relations.  Furthermore,  it  gave  an  impetus  to  Polish-Russian  bilateral 
relations. The LBT “will noticeably facilitate human contacts between the residents of these regions and will 
considerably expand opportunities for developing business ties, inter-regional cooperation, youth exchanges 
                                                   
18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Legal Department, Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Poland and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Rules of Local Border Traffic, 14 December 
2011 (2012). 
19  European  Border  Dialogues  Forum  at  Kaliningrad  and  Elblag,  17-18  November  2011;  Barents  Observer,  21 
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and tourist trips”, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov commented.
20 Thus, the political value of the 
Agreement appears to be even more significant than its practical content.  
Regarding whether the inhabitants of the border region benefited from the Agreement, the statistical data 
gives evidence that this has been the case. In August 2012, 3,699 Poles crossed the border with local border 
traffic permits (LBTPs).
21 The number of Kaliningrad oblast inhabitants applying for permits was initially 
lower, but by October 2012 it had increased by 6,000. The number of those wishing to obtain an LBTP – 
almost 200 per day – exceeds the consulates’ capabilities. Therefore, an outsourcing centre was opened in 
Kaliningrad in November 2012 in charge of issuing the permits.
22  
Nevertheless, the Agreement was criticised even before it came into force. Experts cast doubt about the 
smooth functioning of the new regime, pointing out shortcomings at checkpoints, which were not ready to 
cope with the increased number of crossings.
23 One needs to remember that differences in prices have always 
motivated and stimulated border crossings (chelnok business). LBT has triggered an increase in the prospects 
of petty traders, who bring cheap fuel and cigarettes from Kaliningrad and spirits back from Poland. Their 
activities  cannot  be  qualified  as  smuggling,  if  they  carry  their  goods  in  permitted  quantities.  But  the 
increasing scale of chelnok trade raises concerns among the Kaliningrad business community; moreover, 
sometimes people  need to  wait for seven hours to  cross the border. The  current situation prompted the 
members of Kaliningrad regional Duma to address the deputies of the Sejm of Poland, and ask for their 
assistance in accelerating the check procedures at the Polish-Russian border. 
The launch of LBT at the Polish-Russian border  might have  given impetus to negotiations  on a similar 
agreement with Lithuania, which have stalled since 2009. The text of the agreement was agreed, but the 
Lithuanian side showed no enthusiasm for widening the radius of the border zone. According to Arūnas 
Plikšnys, Director of the Regional Policy Department of the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior, Lithuania 
has  the  intention  of  advancing  the  decision  on  LBT.
24  But  the  Polish-Russian  LBT  is  regarded  by  the 
Commission as exceptional and will hardly set a precedent for the Lithuanian case.
25  
Two other Russian initiatives regarding visa issues in the Kaliningrad oblast are worth mentioning. First, in 
2003 the Kaliningrad regional Duma put forward a proposal to amend federal legislation with the purpose of 
lifting visa requirements for foreigners coming to Kaliningrad. Yet, this initiative was doomed to failure and 
has never been appreciated in Moscow because of the reciprocity issue in visa liberalisation between the EU 
and Russia. The regional deputies’ idea was not supported by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev during his 
visit to Kaliningrad in October 2012.  
Second, the Russian initiative of ‘72 hours visa-free’ was proposed by the participants of the 21
st Baltic Sea 
Parliamentary Conference held in Saint Petersburg on 28 August 2012 as a small step towards establishing a 
visa-free regime. In 2008, the Russian government took the unilateral decision to allow foreign tourists who 
arrived by ferry to stay in Russia for 72 hours visa-free. This regime was applied to Kaliningrad after the 
new  checkpoint  was  established  in  Baltyisk.  The  Russian  delegation  at  the  Conference  expressed  their 
intention to ask the European Parliament to examine the possibilities for establishing a 72-hour visa-free 
regime, although the initiative was not reflected in the Conference’s final resolution. 
To conclude, the establishment of the Polish-Russian LBT can be regarded as a positive small step in EU-
Russia cooperation. Its significance is more political than practical, as it demonstrated the EU’s flexibility in 
solving an issue of common interest, which was highly appreciated by Russia. 
                                                   
20 ITAR-TASS News Agency, 26.07.2012. 
21 Kaliningrad news (http://kaliningrad.net/news/69409/). 
22 Polish cultural centre in Kaliningrad (http://polska-kaliningrad.ru/ru/2012-10-20-10-36-42/news/398-pleasure). 
23 V. Balobaev, “Small border traffic risks to go down in history as a project of ‘great border traffic jams’”, 2012 
(http://news.rambler.ru/12273264/photos/). 
24 See Rugrad.eu, “Head of Department of the Ministry of Interior of Lithuania: The question of small border traffic 
with Lithuania can be resolved within six months”, 13.09.2012 (http://rugrad.eu/news/527656/). 
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2.2  Implementation of the Readmission Agreement  
Readmission  policy  constitutes  one  of  the  main  provisions  in  the  Road  Map.  The  readmission  of  one 
country’s nationals irregularly staying in another country is a principle of international public law. Yet, the 
EU sought to include a clause in the agreement whereby irregular migrants who entered the EU via Russia 
coming from a third country or stateless persons would also be subject to readmission. In other words, the 
clause stipulates that Moscow had to be responsible for the readmission procedure of an irregular migrant 
who transited through Russia before entering the EU. This clause was accepted by Russia after Brussels 
offered a tempting incentive at the time of negotiations of the Readmission Agreement: the VFA with a 
prospect of a visa-free regime.  
The EU-Russia Readmission Agreement entered into force in June 2007 (Council of the European Union, 
2007b). The leverage of Russia vis-à-vis the Union translated into a three-year delay before the clause of 
readmitting transit  migrants and stateless persons became  operational in the second  half  of 2010,  when 
Russia had to take the heavy burden and responsibility for the transit migrants entering the EU from Russia’s 
territory.
26  Nevertheless,  the  five  years  of  implementing  the  EU-Russia  Readmission  Agreement 
demonstrated that the burden proved not to be so heavy. Three centres were constructed in the Moscovskaya 
and Permskaya oblasts as well as in the Krasnodarskiy krai. They have an occupancy rate of approximately 
70% and very few requests for readmission of transit migrants (see Table A1 in the Annex). 
In addition, the EU asked for the signature of implementing protocols of the agreement with Russia, to give 
more certainty to the obligations emanating from it. This process is still underway and has been included as 
one  of  the  commitments  in  the  Common  Steps,  in  an  attempt  to  give  stimulus  to  the  signature  of  the 
Protocols. By mid-December 2012, only two EU member states had not signed the protocols with Russia: 
Greece and Portugal.  
Russia had to reform its legal basis since the term ‘readmission’ was not included in the federal legislation 
until  2006.  The  normative  basis  is  being  developed  to  divide  powers  in  implementing  the  readmission 
procedure among the interested authorities – the FMS, the Ministry of Interior and the Federal Security 
Service. The EU-Russia Joint Readmission Committee is an SOM that discusses any matters related to the 
implementation of the Readmission Agreement, including data on readmitted persons. There have been no 
major complaints about the implementation of the Agreement, which was confirmed at the Nicosia PPC in 
October 2012 (Council of the European Union, 2012a). 
The number of requests received by Russia for readmission of its own citizens has been increasing but the 
readmission procedure has been smooth. The improvement of the border management systems together with 
the border guards’ cooperation played a positive role (Jaroszewicz, 2012, p. 15). But there is a problem with 
the identification of migrants with no documents, which is common to all Readmission Agreements. The 
Joint Readmission Committee approved a Special Protocol on Identification, laying down the structure of 
interviews to identify the country of origin.
27  
A statistical analysis shows that since 2007, Russia has received requests mainly from Germany (57%), 
Norway  and  Sweden  (9%),  and  Austria  (6%).  In  its  turn,  since  2007  Russia  has  deported  53  irregular 
migrants and revealed 48 wanted persons.
28 Several persons, whose asylum applications were rejected in the 
EU, were re-admitted in the North Caucasus and, being wanted for various crimes, were transferred to the 
Ministry of Interior.
29 
One of the main preconditions for visa liberalisation is the conclusion of Readmission Agreements between 
Russia and non-EU states. Negotiations with a number of countries were launched several years ago. They 
have  reached  successful  conclusions  with  Armenia,  Iceland,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Moldova  (to  be 
signed), Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. The Agreement with Ukraine is 
                                                   
26 Russia most likely advocated a delay in the entry into force of the clause because of it expected visa liberalisation 
would be established by 2010. 
27 Based on an interview with an official of the European Commission. 
28 Expert group on updating the “Strategy 2020” (strategy2020.rian.ru/load/366063053). 
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expected to play a key role in fighting irregular migration. It was signed on 22 October 2012 together with 
the Implementation Protocol. The progress in fighting irregular migration would be much more far-reaching 
if the agreement had been concluded with countries of origin of irregular migration, such as India, Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan,  Lebanon,  Mongolia  and  North  Korea.  In  this  sense,  the  FMS  suggests  the  inclusion  of  a 
readmission clause in any bilateral agreement signed by Russia.  
The implementation of the Readmission Agreement can be regarded as one of a few spheres of the Road 
Map  and  the  Common  Steps  where  progress  is  not  called  into  question.  Russia  implemented  this  EU 
technical condition and the progress in concluding the relevant agreements with Russia’s neighbours to the 
east  strengthens  the  security  of  the  EU  borders  and  contributes  to  reducing  the  EU’s  fears  of  irregular 
migration as a consequence of visa liberalisation. 
2.3  Border management: Implementing the Working Arrangement between 
FRONTEX and the Russian Federal Border Service and negotiating border 
demarcation agreements 
Russia became the first country to sign the Working Arrangement (WA) with FRONTEX in February 2006, 
the main content of which entails capacity building for border guards, the deployment of joint actions at the 
border and exchange of data on irregular migration flows. Two cooperation plans between the EU agency 
and the Russian Federal Border Service (FBS) followed for the periods 2007-2010 and 2011-2014, aimed at 
further developing contacts. These included the organisation of activities in risk analysis and information 
exchange,  irregular  immigration  and  joint  operations,  training,  participation  in  multilateral  symposiums 
linked to border  guard activities, and finally  joint operative actions.  All  of them constitute socialisation 
measures.  
On the basis of the WA, Russia participated as an observer in the operations that were organised in the 
context of the Euro 2008 and Euro 2012 football tournaments. In 2009, two joint operations were held at the 
EU-Russia borders – “Mercury” and “Good Will” – to enhance interaction, including information exchanges 
among the FBS, FRONTEX and the relevant member states’ authorities. During the two-week “Mercury” 
operation,  about  50  refusals  of  entry  were  registered,  one  irregular  migrant  apprehended,  two  cases  of 
falsified documents were uncovered and one stolen car was detected.
30 The smuggling of cigarettes was 
identified as one of the common illegal activities.  
A wider field for cooperation between FRONTEX and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) 
could be open across the entire Eurasian space. Russia is vitally interested in involving FRONTEX in a 
series of annual operations called ‘Nelegal’ (irregular migrant) and the deeper cooperation with the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC) structures. The latest Russia-FRONTEX working plan emphasises efforts 
to provide security for the Sochi Winter Olympic Games in 2014. 
Besides the border management cooperation in the framework of FRONTEX and the Russian FBS, the Road 
Map  calls  for  the  signature  of  international  agreements  on  border  demarcation  between  Russia  and  EU 
member states sharing borders with Russia. Russia and two Baltic EU member states, Latvia and Lithuania, 
have overcome their problems and controversies. On 27 March 2007, Russia signed and ratified a border 
treaty with Latvia after a long dispute concerning the Pytalovo/Abrene region. On the basis of this treaty, the 
bilateral Commission  on demarcation began  its  work in 2009 and physical  demarcation started  in 2011 
according to the respective plan. Demarcation is to be completed by 2013.  
The  Russian-Lithuanian  Border  Demarcation  Agreement,  signed  in  1997  and  ratified  in  2003,  was 
considered ‘a package deal’ based upon balanced mutual interests. A bilateral commission was established in 
2006. Russia took responsibility for border demarcation in the Kurshskiy gulf of the Baltic Sea. In October 
2012,  the  meeting  of  the  bilateral  commission  completed  the  process  on  border  demarcation  along  the 
Kurshskaya Kosa (Curonian Spit).  
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In the meantime, the border demarcation process with Estonia has been deadlocked owing to the lack of a 
border  treaty.  As  a  consequence,  the  border  was  being  demarcated  unilaterally.  Russian-Estonian 
consultations started in October 2012, however, which are aimed at renegotiating and signing a treaty. 
Border management cooperation is another success story for the implementation of the Road Map. The next 
step  and  the  future  challenge  is  to  widen  cooperation,  including  Russia’s  participation  in  the  irregular 
migration  programmes  of  the  Eastern  Partnership  and  FRONTEX  involvement  in  operations  across  the 
Eurasian space, which could contribute to strengthening regional security.  
2.4  Drugs cooperation 
The development of an agreed drugs policy based on the United Nations Conventions and the legal system 
for bilateral (Russia-EU) and multilateral (Russia and the EU member states) cooperation meets the strategic 
interests of both Russia and the EU. International operational cooperation is becoming the most essential 
element, including the Paris Pact format, the Pompidou Group of the Council of Europe and controlled 
precursor deliveries under Europol’s coordination.  
The deeper involvement of EU member states in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the 
CSTO  programmes  is  fully  supported  by  Russia.  The  SCO  undertakes  a  number  of  initiatives  against 
organised  crime  and  drugs  trafficking,  and  for  many  years  the  CSTO  has  carried  out  the  “Channel 
Operation” to capture drugs convoys on their way from Afghanistan to Central Asia. Observers from more 
than half of NATO’s members participate.  
Regarding drug trafficking, Russia has now become more a destination than a transit area. Indeed, there 
appears to be very limited heroin trafficking to Europe, only 3.8% of the entire amount.
31 Nowadays, Russia 
can  rather  be  considered  the  main  target  on  the  heroin  route  from  Afghanistan,  because  heroine  from 
Afghanistan does not reach Europe, but remains in Russia. This situation makes international support and 
cooperation vital.  
Against this background, Victor Ivanov, Chairman of the Russian State Anti-Drug Committee and Director 
of the Federal Service for Narcotics Traffic Control (FSKN), proposed in June 2011 a joint five-year Russia-
EU plan to be elaborated on the basis of the Russian “Rainbow-2” plan and the anti-drug provisions of the 
report  on  a  New  Strategy  for  Afghanistan,  approved  by  the  European  Parliament  in  December  2010 
(European Parliament, 2010). He believes that the consolidation of these two plans into a single operational 
plan could provide for a synergic effect.  
Ivanov called upon Russia and the EU to set up a joint agency that could contribute, in cooperation with the 
UN,  the  CSTO  and  other  international  organisations,  to  creating  a  stable  system  of  Eurasian  anti-drug 
security. Yet so far, there have been no signs of the EU supporting this initiative by Russia. 
Moreover, drug trafficking has increasingly developed in the reverse direction, from West to East: synthetic 
drugs – amphetamine and related drugs – are brought to Russia and the other members of Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) from the EU member states (mainly Portugal, the UK and the Netherlands). The 
Commission and Europol reports provide documentary evidence that the increase in illicit production and 
turnover of synthetics is becoming more and more pressing.  
Special expert meetings are held in The Hague on the destruction of illicit precursor trafficking as well as the 
development of a legal basis on the prevention of precursors leaking into illicit turnover. The key issues on 
the agenda are exchanging experience on reducing the consumption of drugs and psychotropic substances, 
and the treatment and rehabilitation  of  drug addicts. Cooperation  is  developing between FSKN and the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). A meeting took place in Moscow 
in October 2012, which discussed the possibility of involving a Russian expert in the EMCDDA’s work, as 
well  as  the  prospect  of  exchanging  experience  in  establishing  national  observatories  on  drugs.  The 
negotiations on the Russia-EU Agreement on Drug Precursors reached their final stage in 2011. Four rounds 
of expert consultations took place, and the EU-Russia summit in December 2012 stated that the negotiations 
have been completed, and the agreement ready for signature in 2013.  
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The EU-Russia drugs cooperation is developing positively in consultations between EMCDDA and the RF 
FSKN on prevention and on treatment of those addicted to drugs. Both parties show interest in exchanging 
experience and best practices, which once again constitute socialisation measures. Cooperation against drug 
trafficking has not brought any significant results because the EU is more focused on other drug routes, such 
as the Balkans. Still, stopping drug trafficking is a global challenge, in which both Russia and the EU should 
participate in full. To fulfil this task, Russia’s bilateral cooperation with the EU member states, which has 
already been fruitful, could be further developed, as well as the EU-Russia involvement in international fora 
and the other common initiatives.  
2.5  Dialogue on migration and asylum 
The dialogue on migration and asylum was launched on 27 June 2011 with fairly developed workshops and 
seminars at the expert level. EU-Russia JLS cooperation had been lacking in such dialogue, which is why it 
was qualified as a “historical event” by Konstantin Romodanovsy, who heads the FMS.
32 The migration 
dialogue covers all aspects of migration, including support of legal migration, the regulation of migratory 
flows,  the  fight  against  irregular  migration,  international  protection  and  migrants’  integration.  The  first 
thematic  working  session  took  place  in  December  2011  in  Moscow.  It  was  devoted  to  cooperation  on 
asylum, including statistics and data exchange, the role of international organisations and civil society, and 
the conditions and procedures associated with reception. 
According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “a number of Eastern European countries 
often prioritise irregular migration control over asylum”, which might apply to Russia, as the scale of the 
irregular migration problem exceeds that of asylum significantly. Since 2007, the FMS has examined more 
than 13,000 applications and only 10% on average annually are deemed satisfactory. According to FMS 
official  statistics,  by  October  2012,  801  refugees  had  been  registered.  In  2012,  3,370  have  received 
temporary protection compared with 3,996 in 2011.
33 Traditionally, the number of refugees has not been very 
high (500-800 a year), but it increased in 2008 after the armed conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Georgians still make up the majority of refugees, followed by Afghans, and a fewer number of Uzbeks. As 
regards the  integration  of refugees, according to Ekaterina Egorova, the FMS Deputy Head, their small 
number is explained by the fact that they become Russian citizens in the course of a year.
34 Still, 127,000 
stateless persons are reported by the UNHCR, and the problem is recognised by both the FMS and human 
rights organisations,
35 but certain achievements can be noted in the reduction of statelessness. Between 2003 
and 2010, more than 600,000 formerly stateless persons were naturalised.
36  
Large-scale  internal  displacement  remains  a  challenge  in  Russia  too  –  up  to  a  million  people  are  still 
displaced in the Caucasus region. Yet the UNHCR closed its sub-office in Vladikavkaz in 2011, and ended 
direct assistance for internally  displaced persons, most likely because the  vulnerable population benefits 
from a Russian fund for investment and development. Many constraints remain: limited access to asylum 
procedures in border-transit zones in airports, readmission and detention centres together with ill treatment 
and deportation before the final decisions on asylum claims are taken. Overall, however, the UNHCR’s 
assessment shows that “both national and regional partnerships with the Russian Federation on asylum and 
statelessness  issues  have  been  strengthened,  contributing  to  the  renewal  and  updating  of  the  country’s 
legislative  instruments  and  processes.  In  Russia  there  have  also  been  improvements  in  the  reception  of 
asylum seekers and the determination of their claims.”
37 
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Yet, a number of urgent issues could be solved by the EU and Russia in the framework of the dialogue. The 
number of asylum seekers in the EU of Russian origin remains high (18,200 in 2011), and that is seen as a 
serious obstacle for visa liberalisation. Still, 80% of the applications are rejected,
38 which makes the case 
very ambiguous. Among those who are really in need of international protection, there are many pretending 
to receive international protection for quite different reasons – from economic motivations to fleeing from 
justice. Finally, they join the figures of irregular migrants in the EU. Most of the asylum seekers come from 
the  North  Caucasus.  To  improve  the  situation,  in  addition  to  readmission,  in  2011  the  FMS  and  the 
International  Organisation  for  Migration  launched  the  project  on  “Voluntary  Return  and  Reintegration 
Assistance  for  Russian  Citizens”,  in  particular  for  those  returning  to  the  Chechen  republic.  That 
notwithstanding, the influx of asylum seekers from the North Caucasus remains an issue of concern and 
further mechanisms to protect the rights of asylum seekers could be developed in the framework of the 
dialogue.  
The meeting on the “Fight against Irregular Migration”, held on 30 March 2012, was devoted to the causes 
and  effects  of  irregular  migration,  the  models  of  risk  analysis,  preventive  measures  against  irregular 
migration (increasing document security, including biometrics and tracing false documents). Russia and the 
EU exchanged information and statistics on migration flows and routes as well as the results of operational 
cooperation. In the following meeting, the dialogue on “Migration and Development” held on 26 October 
2012 in Saint Petersburg, the sides exchanged their views and best practices on the key correlated issues 
(migration, remittances and integration). In addition, Russia noted the priority of favouring the return of 
highly skilled specialists. According to Ekaterina Egorova, the FMS Deputy Head, “Russia considers this 
issue from the position of a dual advantage: returning migrants satisfy the requirements of the national labour 
market and stimulates the [economy’s] growth”.
39 
The migration dialogue runs smoothly because it covers more topics of mutual interest than contradictions. 
Both sides possess rich experience, both positive and negative. The participants hope to move from the 
exchange of best practices to an operational phase and spot elements.
40 The dialogue might play a positive 
role in strengthening cooperation in the post-Soviet space. Despite Russia’s rather reticent attitude to the 
Eastern Partnership initiative, it is very interested in a number of its programmes. The EU, which is rather 
cautious about the EurAsEC, might be more engaged in the fight against irregular migration. What is more, 
the EU’s experience in anti-discrimination legislation, which forbids discrimination on the grounds of race 
and nationality, might be much needed to promote freedom of movement in the framework of EurAsEC. 
2.6  Cooperation on transnational organised crime  
EU-Russia cooperation in the field of organised crime constitutes another element of cooperation in light of 
the  Road  Map.  The  Cooperation  Agreement  between  Europol  and  Russia  has  been  the  legal  basis  for 
cooperation  on  transnational  organised  crime.  It  was  signed  in  Rome  on  6
th  November  2003  and  has 
consisted  in  the  exchange  of  information,  experience  and  best  practices,  pieces  of  legislation  and  other 
documents, as well as the organisation of study visits, expert workshops and seminars. From the Russian 
side, the Ministry of the Interior is competent for cooperation with Europol. In addition, a Russian National 
Contact  Point  for  Europol  was  created  to  carry  out  specific  tasks  such  as  operational  activities  and 
workshops  and  seminars.  The  information  shared  by  Russia  is  used  in  the  publication  of  the  Europol 
Organised Crime Threat Assessment. The ongoing negotiations on a Europol-Russia Operational Agreement 
will provide  with an  enhanced legal basis for cooperation  on  organised crime between law-enforcement 
authorities.  
Other platforms to promote discussions on combating organised crime have been set, such as the EU-Russia 
High Level Police Chiefs’ Meetings. Moreover, the Russian Ministry of the Interior and the European Police 
College (CEPOL) have cooperated in organising a Conference in Tallinn on 29-31 October 2012, with the 
participation of representatives from 18 EU Member States, INTERPOL and FRONTEX. The state of play 
                                                   
38 Eurostat, Data in Focus, No. 8/2012, p. 11. 
39 RIA Novosti news agency, Federal portal, 29.10.2012. 
40 Based on an interview with an official of the European Commission. 14  HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA & POTEMKINA 
 
and prospects of law enforcement cooperation were discussed, including the training of police personnel. To 
that end, CEPOL and the Academy of Management of the Russian Ministry of the Interior signed a draft 
protocol in the margins of the Conference.  
Regarding  cooperation  on  cyber  crime,  it  was  included  in  the  EU-Russia  JLS  agenda  in  2008.  The 
programme of the experts’ meetings was approved to discuss measures for stopping the distribution of video 
materials  containing  scenes  of  violence  towards  children.  Russia  suggested  supplying  law  enforcement 
bodies with full information on IT transborder crimes so that they could arrest criminals and bring them to 
trial. An exchange of requests has already been organised on addressing cyber crime. Russia proposed to 
work out the typology of transborder cybercrimes, so that any relevant information about their commitment 
could be immediately sent to the law enforcement bodies of the aggrieved party through the channels of the 
international network of the national contact points. To achieve this aim, it seems very significant to compare 
the existing Russian and European practices in this field. In this sense, the EU should adopt a Cyber Security 
Strategy in January 2013, a joint exercise by EEAS, the Commission, which should be the basis for an 
upcoming EU Cyber Security directive.  
EU-Russia cooperation could be supplemented by a new task of creating a cyber space, where the new 
common  definition  of  ‘cyber  security’  can  be  developed.  In  2008,  the  sides  started  discussing  the 
possibilities of such cooperation. The Cooperation Agreement between Europol and Russia in force (2003), 
as well as the upcoming operational one, might form the legal basis for this kind of interaction. To achieve 
results in fighting cyber terrorism, Russia could participate in the Europol project ‘Check the web’, which is 
aimed at disclosure of Islamist terrorist websites. However, cooperation in this extremely important sphere is 
complicated by the same factors that hinder the entire EU-Russia counter-terrorist cooperation: the lack of a 
common perception on the basis of which websites can be considered terrorist. A single criterion could 
hardly be established without a single approach to the terrorist lists. In the same way as cutting off financing 
of terrorism, the websites which belong to the organisations included both in Russia’s and the EU’s terrorist 
lists could be currently suppressed. 
In January 2011, the EU Member States and Russia’s operational police units decided at a meeting in the 
Hague  to  include  a  Russian  representative  in  the  Europol  Expert  Group  –  the  European  Cyber  Crime 
platform.  The  sides  also  agreed  on  studying  possibilities  of  information  exchange  on  harmful  virus 
programmes, which are used for criminal purposes.  
2.7  Negotiations on working agreements with Europol and Eurojust 
The Europol-Russia negotiations on the agreement concerning the exchange of personal data, which would 
considerably strengthen cooperation on transnational crime, were finally launched on 21-22 October 2010 
after several years of preparations. The meeting was preceded by the EU-Russia Conference on personal data 
protection. The problem of compliance by Russia with the Council of Europe standards on data protection 
became the key point of the discussions. In 2005, Russia ratified the Council of Europe Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (2001). The ratification 
required the further amendment of 23 legal acts in Russia, which has slowed down the process significantly. 
In 2006, in the framework of the Convention, Russia adopted the Federal Law on Personal Data, Information 
Technologies  and  the  Protection  of  Information,  which  did  not  lead  automatically  to  the  opening  of 
negotiations on the operational agreement with Europol. Finally, the amended Federal Law on Personal Data 
was adopted by the State Duma and approved by the Federation Council on 13 July 2011. The legal basis 
was  enacted  in  Russia,  which  includes  74  Federal  Laws,  14  Presidential  Orders  and  79  Government 
Enactments. The Additional Protocol to the Convention was signed in 2006 but has not been ratified yet. 
The situation has been complicated by Russia’s administrative incompatibility with the Council of Europe’s 
standards regarding control over the protection of personal information. In Russia, the Federal Service for 
Supervision  in  the  Sphere  of  Telecom,  Information  Technologies  and  Mass  Communications 
(Roskomnadzor) was established in 2007 and authorised with the necessary competences. Furthermore, the 
Prosecutor General’s Office fulfils supervisory functions, including personal data protection. Roskomnadzor, RUSSIA AND THE COMMON SPACE ON FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE  15 
as an authorised body, publishes annual reports on the results of its activities.
41 Its representatives participate 
in the negotiations on the agreements with Europol and Eurojust, where the European partners attach key 
importance to Roskomnadzor’s position on the order and conditions of automatic processing of personal 
data.
42  Nevertheless,  the  Council  of  Europe’s  standards  on  information  protection  require  internal 
institutional restructuring in Russia: the establishment of an independent supervisory body.  
In spite of the Presidential Order, issued in 2006 for the signature of the Additional Protocol, the creation of 
the independent supervisory body is still under examination. In May 2012, the Russian Federation Council’s 
special commission on information started examining the possibility of creating a supervisory authority. Still, 
at the PPC meeting on 3 October 2012 in Nikosia, Alexandr Konovalov, who headed the Russian delegation, 
called it “a stumbling block” in the negotiations on the agreement.
43 However, the prospects for the signature 
of  the  operational  agreement  remain  unclear.  The  same  applies  to  the  discussion  on  the  operational 
agreement with Eurojust, whose negotiations started in 2007 with four rounds.  
It should be  mentioned that the EU faced a similar challenge  when  negotiating Europol and Eurojust’s 
operational agreements with the US. In spite of the absence of appropriate legislation in the US and an 
independent supervisory body, the agreements were finally signed. The EU-US JLS cooperation covers the 
same issue areas as the EU-Russia  one,  without the legal basis provided by an  international agreement 
between the parties, such as the EU-Russia PCA. The cooperation is framed in a more flexible manner, in the 
format of SOMs. A high level of trust and commitments to fight against organised crime allowed partners to 
overcome controversies. Nowadays, bilateral agreements with EU member states as well as cooperation with 
the liaison officers have allowed Russia to exchange information in the process of joint operations under 
Europol’s coordination. Yet, Alexander Prokopchuk, the head of Russia’s Central Interpol bureau, believes 
that the conclusion of the operational agreement would surely increase the effectiveness of joint activities.
44  
The  negotiations  on  operational  agreements  between  Russia  and  Europol  and  Eurojust  have  resulted  in 
partial success. Russia’s efforts in reforming the domestic legal basis in order to sign and ratify the relevant 
Council of Europe Convention should be appreciated. Still, the absence of an independent body to control 
information exchange is slowing down progress. The prospect of signing the operational agreements does not 
seem tempting  enough for Russia to change the institutional structure in this sphere.  But given that the 
operational  agreements  with  Europol  and  Eurojust  are  a  precondition  for  visa  liberalisation  under  the 
Common Steps element on internal security, Russia will be encouraged to implement the necessary reforms. 
2.8  Counter-terrorism cooperation  
Counter-terrorism cooperation has been traditionally fruitful in the context of Russia's bilateral relations with 
the EU Member states. However, the EU and Russia established it a key element in both the Road map on 
AFSJ and the external security.  
In  March  2006,  the  State  Duma  adopted  the  Federal  Law  on  Ratification  of  the  Council  of  Europe 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, and it was regarded as a significant step in implementing the 
Road Map. Russia has become party of more than 20 counter-terrorist international legal acts under the 
auspices of the UN, the Council of Europe, the CIS and the SCO.  
The  priorities  of  counter-terrorist  cooperation  are  currently  identified  at  the  PPC  meetings.  Besides,  a 
working  dialogue  started  in  February  2011  between  Gilles  de  Kerchove,  the  EU  Counter-terrorism 
Coordinator and Ambassador Anatoly Safonov, Special Representative of the President of the Russia for 
International Cooperation in the Fight against Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime. They develop 
further steps in strengthening cooperation and exchange with assessments of the regional and global aspects 
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of terrorist threats. In May 2011 in Brussels, Mr. de Kerchove was decorated with the medal of the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs “for Contribution to International Cooperation”. 
Following the commitment in the Road Map, Russia shows readiness to undertake the preparation of the 
draft  Memorandum  of  Understanding  on  fight  with  terrorism,  which  would  replace  the  current  Joint 
Statement of 2002. This Memorandum would bring an obvious added value. It could incorporate urgent 
common priorities such as counteracting the ideology of terrorism, propaganda and incitement to terrorism, 
civil society active involvement in counteracting terrorism, promoting inter-civilisation dialogue. All these 
elements were neither reflected in the Joint Statement nor in the Road Map. 
The agenda of the EU-Russia summit in December 2012 included an assessment of the counter-terrorism 
political dialogue and especially the meeting, which took place in Moscow in November 2012. The sides 
expressed  their  endeavor  “to  give  further  impetus  to  counter-terrorism  cooperation  and  strengthen 
cooperation on the prevention of terrorism, in particular radicalisation, the promotion of criminal justice and 
rule of law, combating of terrorist financing as well as bilateral cooperation in multilateral fora such as the 
UN and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF)”.
45 
To  sum  up,  significant  potential  has  been  accumulated  in  Russia-EU  counter-terrorism  cooperation. 
Nowadays, further efforts are needed to bring cooperation to a new level and fill it with concrete substance. 
2.9  Judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters 
Consultations on stepping up judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters form a special part of the 
Road  Map,  which  has  significantly  stimulated  Russia’s  aspiration  to  join  international  conventions  on 
combating organised crime and corruption. In 2006, Russia ratified the Council of Europe Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption, which entered into force in 2007. In 2009, Russia signed the Additional Protocol 
and expressed a similar interest in the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance 
in Criminal Matters, which will increase possibilities to obtain evidence on committed crimes. Adopting the 
Civil Law Convention on Corruption has been under discussion since 2000, although some of its provisions 
were included in the domestic legislation on corruption. 
In 2008, the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters was signed, as was the 
Convention  on  Laundering,  Search,  Seizure  and  Confiscation  of  the  Proceeds  from  Crime  and  on  the 
Financing of Terrorism in 2009. At around the same time, in 2008 Russia refused to join the Council of 
Europe  Convention  on  Cybercrime,  unless  provisions  on  cross-border  access  to  computer  systems  are 
amended.  
In the framework of experts’ consultations, preconditions have been discussed for signing the Agreement 
between  the  Russian  Ministry  of  Justice  and  the  European  Judicial  Network  in  Civil  and  Commercial 
Matters. The sides are expected to negotiate the spheres that could be covered by the Agreement as well as 
the principles of recognition and implementation of court decisions. The official negotiations are to start as 
soon  as  the  Commission  receives  the  respective  mandate  and  would  constitute  another  measure  of 
socialisation. 
The process has slowed down because of mixed positions within Russia and in the State Duma regarding the 
reasonability of joining a number of The Hague Conventions, such the Convention on the Protection of 
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. In the framework of consultations, Russia’s 
position has been put forward. It was only in 2001 that Russia became a full Conference participant, so 
joining The Hague Conventions requires the adoption of legislation and financial costs. Actually, Russia 
prefers bilateral international agreements on the adoption of children. Moreover, there is no common support 
in  Russia  for  either  inter-country  adoption  or  juvenile  justice,  which  is  rejected  by  a  large  segment  of 
Russian  society.  Nevertheless,  Russia  participates  in  a  number  of  Hague  Conventions,  notably  those 
concerning jurisdiction, recognition, enforcement and in respect of parental responsibility and the protection 
of children (since June 2012) and on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (since June 2011). They 
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were  both  adopted  with  certain  derogations,  fixing  inter  alia  the  Russian  authorities’  jurisdiction  on 
protecting children’s property rights. 
The EU has a distrust of the judiciary system in Russia, shared by many Russians, which remains a challenge 
for Russian authorities. The participation of Russian judges in the common training programmes, including 
their visits to the relevant European bodies, can be seen as additional socialisation measures. 
3.  Assessment of the Intersection between the Common Space and the 
Promotion of Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in EU-Russia 
Relations 
KEY FINDINGS 
  The EU and Russia have assessed in a negative and politicised way the human rights situation in each 
other’s territory. The Council of Europe and independent organisations claim that there are challenges 
in the protection of human rights in both the EU and in Russia.  
  EU-Russia consultations  on  human rights, which have been  held biannually since 2005, have been 
severely  criticised  by  independent  organisations.  The  European  Parliament  has  called  for  an 
enhancement of the consultations so that they are more effective and results-oriented. 
  The Nicosia PPC in October 2012 included a reference to the principle of independence of the judiciary 
as well as a clear commitment that links the respect for human rights and rule of law with cooperation 
in the AFSJ, but made no reference to the promotion of democracy. 
 
This section focuses on the linkage between the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice and the 
promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. First, the section looks at the assessment of 
human rights situations in Russia from a Brussels-based perspective and in the EU from a Moscow-based 
perspective, as well from the viewpoints of the Council of Europe and independent organisations. Second, 
the section looks at the formulation in the PCA and the Road Map of cooperation in JLS and the promotion 
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as well as the human rights consultations as an instrument 
for human rights discussions between the EU and Russia. It explains the reasons underlying the limited 
results of the  human rights consultations  in addressing situations where  human rights are not protected. 
Third, the section looks at the prospects for EU-Russia cooperation in the field of human rights in the New 
Basic Agreement, as well as in the Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel.  
The Road Map refers to the “common commitments to democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” as the basis for EU-Russia JLS cooperation (EU-Russia, 2011, p. 45). Regarding the human rights 
situation in Russia from an EU perspective, in 2011 the Council of the European Union gave a negative 
assessment, in which it claimed that there has been “little improvement” in this respect (Council of the 
European Union, 2011, p. 23). It presents among others reports of violence by law enforcement authorities in 
the North Caucasus, no progress in media pluralism, difficulties in holding public demonstrations, torture 
and ill treatment in detention centres and increased racism, xenophobia and homophobia. As for the rule of 
law, the Council raises concerns about the situation of human rights defenders and independent journalists. 
Finally, the document also claims that Russia fails to comply with judgments by the European Court of 
Human Rights and the ratification of Protocol 6 of the ECHR on the abolition of the death penalty, although 
Russia applies a moratorium in this case.  
For its part, the European Parliament adopted resolutions on the rule of law in Russia in February 2011, and 
on the political use of justice in Russia in September 2012, in which it reaffirmed the belief that Russia 
remains an important partner for the EU in building sustainable cooperation based on democracy and the rule 
of law (European Parliament, 2011, point 1), but mentions that the human rights situation in Russia has 
deteriorated because of “intimidation, harassment and arrests of the representatives of opposition forces and 
non-governmental organisations, the recent adoption of a law on the financing of NGOs, on the right of 
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free  and  independent  media  and  minorities  in  sexual  orientation  and  religious  belief”.  The  Parliament 
reminds Russia that as a member of the Council of Europe it has signed up to all the human rights acquis and 
calls on Russia to comply with the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (European Parliament, 
2011, point 13).  
An individual case that attracted considerable attention in the EU as regards the human rights situation in 
Russia  and  the  independence  of  the  judiciary  is  the  ‘Pussy  Riot’  case.  In  Russia,  the  experts,  media 
community and citizens perceived the performance of the band in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in 
different ways. In any case, it must be taken into account that it is an individual case that had exceptional 
media  coverage,  which  many  other  cases  do  not  experience.  The  whole  situation,  including  the  media 
campaign, has profoundly deepened popular distrust in Russia and the EU and revived discussion on the 
compatibility of liberal and traditional values. The EU’s concerns about the imprisonment of the Pussy Riot 
members were expressed by the German Bundestag as well as German Chancellor Angela Merkel in the 
framework of then Russia-Germany intergovernmental consultations in Saint Petersburg in November 2012. 
The German criticism did not prevent the sides from signing ten bilateral agreements, including one on 
facilitating  youth  exchanges.  Thus,  Germany  has  opted  for  socialisation  instead  of  conditionality  in  its 
relations with Russia.  
As for the assessment of the human rights situation in the EU from a Russian angle, Moscow has criticised 
Brussels for not respecting the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. The EU has 
referred to this as politicised criticism. Moscow finds the EU’s criticism politicised as well, and does not 
accept the European Parliament’s resolutions. As for the resolution on the political use of justice in Russia, it 
was considered “one-sided” and “based on improbable sources”. The Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
mentioned that “the EU Parliament did not take into account the explanations given by [the] Russian side 
during  the  meeting  of  the  working  groups  of  the  EU-Russia  Parliamentary  Cooperation  Committee”.
46 
According to the State Duma, by reason of its bias the resolution will have “a zero effect in Russia”. The 
State Duma deputies added the reminder that “the European experience was used for developing the new 
legislation in Russia on violation of order during the actions of protests and others”, and expressed regret that 
the  Members  of  the  European  Parliament  emphasised  all  the  negative  aspects,  with  the  distortions  and 
ignored the positive changes in Russian legislation and the political situation.
47  
Russia’s will to establish symmetry in the human rights sphere was evident in two reports by the Ministry for 
Foreign  Affairs,  which  were  published  in  December  2011  and  2012.  The  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs 
analysed in detail “the situation of non-citizens in the Baltic countries, Roma people, migrants and refugees, 
and manifestations of racism and xenophobia”, calling them “particularly troublesome human rights issues in 
the EU”. Furthermore, the reports included cases of infringements in privacy and personal data protection, 
the rights of detainees, freedom of mass media, a lack of separation of powers and politicisation in criminal 
proceedings, freedom of assembly and speech in member states. The reports were mainly aimed at drawing 
the attention of EU member states as well as EU supranational bodies to serious internal challenges before 
applying conditionality in external relations. In its second 2012 report, which was published amidst increased 
criticism  from  the  EU  side,  Russia  expressed  a  desire  “for  a  constructive  dialogue  of  equals  with  the 
European Union on human rights and democratic development, which would to the full extent correspond to 
the relations of strategic partnership with the EU”.
48 The report was presented in Brussels on 6 December 
during consultations between Ambassador Konstantin Dolgov (the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law) and Stavros Lambrinidis (EU Special 
Representative for Human Rights), at a press conference for Russian and foreign media and at a meeting 
with representatives of international human rights NGOs.  
The  initiative  was  supported  by  the  State  Duma  Committee  on  International  Affairs,  which  organised 
hearings on the basis of the report by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in May 2012. The head and the other 
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officials  of  the  EU  delegation  participated;  the  representatives  of  international  organisations  and  the 
European Parliament were invited but did not attend. The head of the EU delegation welcomed the initiative 
of the State Duma, as did the Director of Russian Amnesty International, who noted that he considers such 
hearings ‘normal practice’. The hearings did not appear to be a dialogue, however, but rather a continuation 
of reciprocal claims about human rights violations.  
Apart  from  the  position  taken  by  EU  and  Russian  institutions,  independent  evidence  coming  from 
international organisations and independent civil society actors (e.g. the Council of Europe, Human Rights 
Watch, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Amnesty International and the EU-Russia 
Civil Forum) show recent and profound challenges relating to the rule of law in Russia. For example, the 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly called on Russia “to respect the obligations incumbent upon 
every Member State…with regard to pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights”.
49 Similarly, the 
EU-Russia Civil Forum at the same time outlined “a decreased perceptiveness of the European governments 
to the civil society voice in times of economic and financial crisis”.
50 Thus, the protection of human rights 
constitutes a challenge to both Russian and EU Member States. 
Against these assessments of the human rights situation in the EU and Russia, the PCA establishes in Art. 2 
that “[r]espect for democratic principles and human rights as defined in particular in the Helsinki Final Act 
and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, underpins the internal and external policies of the Parties and 
constitutes an essential element of partnership and of this Agreement” (Council of the European Union, 
1997).  
Since 2005, both parties have held consultations on human rights
51 twice a year, which do not take place in 
parallel  with  the  EU  Summits.  So  far,  the  consultations  have  only  been  held  in  Brussels.  The  EU  has 
proposed a rotation of the consultations between Moscow and Brussels so that members of the Russian 
Ministries of the Interior and Justice can also participate. The EU reports on human rights violations and 
exerts pressure on Russia to adhere to international standards on human rights. Russian experts stated that the 
EU lacks supranational mechanisms of promotion and protection of human rights by its member states and 
that  the  European  Commission  is  mainly  focused  on  assessment  of  the  human  rights  situation  in  third 
countries. In this context they noted the importance of the EU’s prompt accession to the ECHR on equal 
conditions  with  other  participants.
52  From  Russia’s  side,  concerns  are  expressed  about  the  rights  of  the 
Russian-speaking  population  in  the  Baltic  States,  excessive  use  of  force  when  breaking  up  peaceful 
demonstrations, the rights of migrants as well as infringements of the right to privacy. During consultations 
the EU’s support of Russian NGOs is also analysed. Thus, the partial results of the consultations should not 
been  denied. In 2011, the human rights consultations incorporated a civil society dimension – the Civil 
Society Forum (CSF). During the third CSF General Assembly in Saint Petersburg on 9-10 October 2012, 
the participants expressed their concerns about a “visible cooling down of relations between Russia and EU”, 
which “may have long-term consequences, including for civil society on both sides”. The Forum noted an 
element of confusion on the side of the EU in regards to the processes happening in Russia and “a lack of 
understanding  on  how  to  further  develop  dialogue  and  cooperation  with  Russia  in  Brussels  and  other 
European  capitals”.  Consequently,  the  EU-Russia  Civil  Society  Forum  sees  its  mission  as  influencing 
Moscow and Brussels to modulate the cooling of relations for constructive dialogue.
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At the same time, civil society organisations such as the FIDH have heavily criticised the EU-Russia human 
rights consultations and even advocated their suspension, stating that they “have neither contributed to an 
improvement of the human rights situation in Russia, nor increased the level of support to human rights 
defenders” (FIDH, 2010, p. 2). The European Parliament also made reference to the shortcomings of the 
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50 See the Statement of the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum, Saint Petersburg, 10 October 2012. 
51 The latest EU-Russia Human Rights Consultations took place on 7 December 2012.  
52 “Another round of Russia-EU Expert Human Rights Consultations”, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to 
the European Union, 12.10.2012 (http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/another-round-russia-eu-expert-human-rights-
consultations). 
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human rights consultations and called for the “human rights consultations to be stepped up and made more 
effective and results-oriented, with the Russian Ministries of Justice, the Interior and Foreign Affairs taking 
part in the meetings in both Brussels and Moscow and with the full involvement of the European Parliament 
at  all  levels”  (European  Parliament,  2011,  point  14).  The  Road  Map  Progress  Report  2010  foresaw 
improvements in the human rights consultations by stating that the “EU aims to ensure that the discussion on 
these issues is not confined only to the bi-annual Human Rights Consultations but is addressed to the extent 
possible also in the PPC meetings and other meetings taking place within the Space on Freedom, Security 
and Justice” (EU–Russia 2011, p. 45). In other words, the approach advocates the extension of EU-Russia 
human rights cooperation beyond the framework of the human rights consultations.  
Actually, the prospects for enhanced cooperation between the EU and Russia on human rights were put 
forward in the conclusions of the Nicosia PPC in October 2012: “The Parties reiterated the importance of and 
respect for commitments in the area of human rights and rule of law, including the independence of the 
judiciary, which underpin cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice. They also expressed the 
necessity to prevent discrimination, protect minorities and combat hate crimes. They noted the importance of 
EU's prompt accession to the ECHR and Fundamental Freedoms” (Council of the European Union, 2012a, p. 
1). Here, for the first time, the principle of the independence of the judiciary is included in an EU-Russia 
document,  as  well  as  a  clear  commitment  that  links  the  respect  for  human  rights  and  rule  of  law  with 
cooperation in the AFSJ. In addition, the EU’s objective to accede to the ECHR, of which Russia is a party, 
will put the EU and Russia on equal footing as members of the ECHR and may stimulate EU-Russia human 
rights relations through the Council of Europe’s human rights acquis.
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Notably, however, the promotion of democracy is not included in this statement from the Nicosia PPC. 
Alexander Konovalov, the Minister of Justice who chaired the meeting from Russia’s side, emphasised at the 
subsequent press conference “the issues of real significance, which should be put on the top of agenda – 
minimising  and  excluding  completely  the  risks  of  new  possibilities  for  international  criminal  activity, 
excluding factors of  irregular migration, technical  management  of passengers’ flows – both tourists and 
migrants”. Furthermore, “[a]s for the issues, which our partners bring to the first plan”, the Minister added, 
“they might be discussed endlessly. Absolute satisfaction [about] how they will look in 10-20 years might 
never be reached.”
55 Thus, the existence of a common view on the effectiveness of extending human rights 
beyond the framework of the human rights consultations still provokes doubt. 
The framework that can stimulate EU-Russia cooperation on human rights is the Common Steps towards 
visa-free short-term travel. The fourth building block of the set of commitments that the EU and Russia have 
agreed  to  fulfil  contains  a  set  of  measures  in  the  field  of  human  rights,  including  consultations  and 
discussions on the protection of migrants’ rights and anti-discrimination laws. Use of human rights as a tool 
of conditionality in EU-Russia relations is regarded in the EU as an opportunity to promote change, given 
that the incentive of visa liberalisation is very tempting. From Russia’s side, however, prioritising human 
rights  issues  in  every  sphere  of  cooperation  is  considered  counterproductive.  Unlike  the  human  rights 
consultations,  the  provisions  under  the  Common  Steps  are  clearly  formulated  and  will  be  monitored 
regularly. The ongoing implementation of the Action Plans on visa liberalisation in Ukraine and Moldova 
has shown the effectiveness of conditionality to promote reforms on human rights, with the adoption of 
legislation on anti-discrimination law. But the rhetoric of symmetry in EU-Russia human rights cooperation 
prevents the conditionality mechanism from being effective. The more pressure the EU exercises, the more 
resistance from Russia it triggers, unless human rights issues are discussed symmetrically. In any case, both 
sides have committed to the protection of fundamental rights in the framework of the Common Steps.  
Finally, according to an official from the EEAS, the New Agreement will have a significant and far-reaching 
human rights component in the political dialogue and the JLS chapters. The European Parliament confirmed 
the  EEAS  position  by  adopting  the  resolution  of  13  December  2012,  which  contains  the  EP's 
                                                   
54 The Council issued the EU Strategic Framework and Action on Human Rights and Democracy, which sets out the 
objectives of the Union regarding human rights and reaffirms the human rights component of the EU external action. 
See Council of the European Union (2012b).  
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recommendations to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the negotiations of the new EU-Russia 
Agreement and in particular the paragraphs dealing with the respect for democratic principles, human rights 
and the rule of law and considers this respect "as an absolute prerequisite for the signature of an EU-Russia 
agreement".
56 Russia, however, has never expressed the intention to include conditionality provisions in the 
New Agreement. Thus, it is still unclear whether the EU’s intention of an enhanced EU-Russia human rights 
cooperation  as  analysed  above  will  gain  in  legal  certainty  in  EU-Russia  relations.  Until  now,  the 
developments analysed in this section signal that there are strains in EU-Russia relations, and that a renewed 
format for cooperation in human rights is needed.  
4.  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
4.1  Conclusions 
This study has provided a thorough analysis of EU-Russia JLS cooperation in light of the Common Space on 
Freedom,  Security  and  Justice,  adopting  an  approach  that  integrates  both  EU  and  Russian  perspectives. 
Analysis  of  the  implementation  of  the  different  JLS  policy  areas  shows  that  there  has  been  actual 
cooperation, but a main conclusion could be drawn: the cooperation has been uneven and has not led to the 
same outcomes in all the JLS policy areas.  
Progress has been observed in the following policy areas: 
1)  Technical security of passports. In the framework of the Common Steps, Russia launched biometric 
passports that are compliant with the standards of the ICAO. The biometric passports contain a chip 
with information, as well as parameters to transfer information in case of stolen or lost documents. It 
must be taken into account that most EU member states are in the process of introducing biometric 
passports.  
2)  Fight  against  irregular  migration.  The  EU-Russia  Readmission  Agreement  has  been  effectively 
implemented since 2007, including readmission of transit migrants since 2010. Despite the difficulties 
in  identifying  the  nationality  of  transit  migrants,  the  assessment  of  the  implementation  of  the 
Agreement is generally positive. In addition, most implementing protocols with EU member states 
have been ratified.  
3)  Border  management.  A  Working  Arrangement  was  agreed  between  FRONTEX  and  the  Border 
Guard Service of Russia in 2006, enabling information exchange and capacity building for border 
guards. Furthermore, Russian border guards have participated in several FRONTEX Joint Operations. 
Cooperation follows the prescribed plans and could deepen with intensified exchanges. 
4)  Border demarcation. The demarcation processes on the Russian-Latvian and the Russian-Lithuanian 
borders have been completed, with the entry into force of Demarcation Agreements. The negotiations 
between Russia and Estonia, which had been deadlocked since 2005, have been resumed with a view 
to demarcating the common border.  
5)  Counter-terrorism cooperation and fight with organised crime. A significant potential has been 
accumulated  in  Russia-EU  counter-terrorism  cooperation  as  well  as  in  fighting  organised  crime. 
Nowadays, further efforts are needed to bring cooperation to a new level and fill it with concrete 
substance. 
In the following policy areas, however, progress has been limited: 
6)  Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel: Two aspects of the Common Steps could be 
approved by the EU-Russia summit on 21 December. Yet Russia is dissatisfied with the slow speed of 
the implementation process and proposes a quicker road map with a fixed date of starting negotiations 
on a Visa Waiver Agreement. The EU finds the obstacles to visa-free travel to be technical rather than 
political and views visa liberalisation in a longer-term perspective. 
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7)  The failure of the negotiations to conclude an amended Visa Facilitation Agreement (VFA) shows 
the lack of flexibility even in a small particular sphere of EU-Russia relations. Moreover, the EU’s 
lack  of  trust  in  service  passports  and  concerns  about  corruption  in  Russia  put  into  question  the 
recognised progress in the technical security of passports and the very prospects for the liberalisation 
of visas. 
8)  Kaliningrad  border  traffic.  The  Polish-Russian  agreement  on  LBT  is  deemed  a  positive 
achievement, at least from a political standpoint. Still, it will hardly be possible to reach a similar 
Lithuanian-Russian LBT agreement covering the entire Kaliningrad oblast. 
9)  Dialogue on migration and asylum. Four thematic sessions took place with a positive outcome. The 
participants hope to move on from the exchange of best practices to an operational phase and spot 
elements. Yet a high number of asylum seekers from Russia causes concern for the EU and remains a 
challenge  in  EU-Russia  JLS  relations.  The  problem  is  being  discussed  in  the  framework  of  the 
migration dialogue, but no clear prospect for improving the situation is foreseen. 
10)  Drugs cooperation has been developing positively in relation to consultations between the EMCDDA 
and the FSKN on prevention and on the treatment of drug addicts. The EU-Russia Agreement on Drug 
Precursors is ready for signing in 2013. However, there is no progress in joint initiatives against drug 
trafficking originating in Afghanistan. 
11)  Operational Agreements between Russia  and Europol/Eurojust. Russia signed and ratified the 
Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data and signed the Adjacent Protocol to the Convention. In addition, Russia reformed the 
domestic  legal  basis  for  data  protection.  Nevertheless,  the  absence  of  an  independent  supervisory 
authority to control information exchange has brought the negotiations to a standstill. 
12)  Judicial  cooperation.  Expert  discussions  are  underway  on  preconditions  for  the  signature  of  the 
Agreement between the Russian Ministry of Justice and the European Judicial Network in Civil and 
Commercial Matters. The process has slowed down owing to rather mixed views in Russia about the 
reasonability of joining some of The Hague Conventions. In addition, the EU is showing distrust of 
Russia’s judicial system. 
13)  Human rights remain the most controversial issue in EU-Russia relations. The consultations take 
place twice a year with a very limited outcome. The Civil Society Forum was created in 2011, which 
is a positive step but with limited influence so far. The EU and Russia negatively assess each other’s 
human rights situations. Russia insists on the symmetrical treatment of human rights issues. 
To sum up, the EU and Russia have made obvious progress in implementing five policy areas of the EU-
Russia Road Map, while there are limited achievements in the other eight most relevant issue areas, with 
slow progress on visa liberalisation, judicial cooperation and human rights. This study concludes that there is 
a lack of balance between security, on the one hand, and freedom and justice, on the other in EU-Russia 
cooperation in the Road Map. The analysis gives evidence of how security issues are the cornerstone of EU-
Russia  JLS  cooperation  and  account  for  a  number  of  the  outcomes  of  the  Road  Map,  namely  the 
implementation  of  a  Readmission  Agreement  and  the  signature  of  a  Working  Arrangement  between 
FRONTEX and the Russian Federal Border Service, among others. The Common Steps towards visa-free 
short-term travel use security measures as a precondition for visa liberalisation and this approach has proven 
to be effective so far for further implementation of the Readmission Agreement – with the signature of most 
of the implementing protocols with member states, among other security-related policy areas. 
Meanwhile, cooperation on freedom-related areas has not lived up to expectations. Although the local border 
regime was established on the Polish-Russian border, the negotiations on an amended VFA have not been 
successful to date and progress on the visa liberalisation dialogue has been limited. Actually, most of the 
outcomes  of EU-Russia cooperation in the  AFSJ have been in the security realm. In addition, freedom 
measures encapsulate the notion of mobility from a comprehensive point of view, which includes not only 
the  liberalisation  of  short-term  visas,  but  also  fostering  labour  migration,  student  exchanges  and  other 
measures aimed at promoting mobility.  RUSSIA AND THE COMMON SPACE ON FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE  23 
Nevertheless, the Road Map Progress Report 2010 uses the concept of a balance between freedom, security 
and justice when assessing the outcomes of the Road Map. Under the label “freedom”, the report covers the 
areas of readmission, visa policy, local border traffic and border management. The concept of “justice” in the 
Progress  Report  encapsulates  negotiations  on  an  Arrangement  with  Eurojust  and  Russia  acceding  to 
international conventions. As for “security”, this label covers the areas of counter-terrorism, negotiations on 
a Europol Arrangement and drugs cooperation. As mentioned above, it is our understanding that the issues of 
readmission and border management also fall within the security realm. As a result, there is not a balance 
between  freedom,  security  and  justice  in  EU-Russia  JLS  cooperation.  This  assessment  challenges  the 
usefulness  of  systematising  the  JLS  policy  areas  under  this  concept  and  shows  that  this  is  not  a  valid 
approach to framing EU-Russia JLS cooperation.
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Another contribution of the study is the analysis of the current and future institutional structures in EU-
Russia JLS cooperation. On the one hand, the EU faces internal coordination challenges between the EEAS, 
the Commission and also the EU agency services in external relations since the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon. On the other hand, the proposal at the Nicosia PPC meeting in October 2012 to set up a senior 
officials’ meeting once a year covering the full spectrum of EU-Russia JLS cooperation would provide for a 
better institutional setting for such cooperation.  
There are several reasons why progress on the EU-Russia Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice 
is stagnating, in spite of the obviously increasing network of experts’ consultations and professional contacts 
between the parties.  
1)  While good trustful relations have been observed at the professional and expert level in the process of 
consultations and dialogues, there is lack of trust at the political level. This problem is common across 
all EU-Russia relations. As soon as the contacts and consultations reach their final stage, in which a 
norm has to be adopted, the cooperation becomes much more difficult – neither side is ready for 
significant  concessions.  In  many  cases,  there  is  no  flexibility  when  the  contacts  pass  from  the 
expert/professional to the political level. Meanwhile, the Road Map has not  materialised  in clear, 
tangible outcomes, such as the signature of the operational agreements with Europol/Eurojust or the 
EU-Russia VFA. 
2)  In addition, the differences between Russian and European legal and administrative practices have 
been  slowing  down  progress,  as  legal  reform  is  costly  and  requires  time,  effort  and  consensus. 
Examples  here  are  the  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  Information  Protection  and  The  Hague 
Conventions.  
3)  In  drawing  up  the  list  of  Common  Steps  with  the  four  building  blocks  of  preconditions  for  visa 
liberalisation, EU-Russia JLS cooperation is closely interlinked and mainly focused on security. Thus, 
the  lack  of progress in certain  directions  minimises  achievements in the  others. For  example, the 
absence of operational agreements with Europol and Eurojust prevents the visa liberalisation process 
from going further. As a result, the general progress is very limited.  
4)  While showing readiness in complying with the technical preconditions for visa liberalisation, Russia 
has  demonstrated  strong  opposition  to  political  conditionality,  which  the  EU  uses  as  a  tool  for 
promoting human rights. Russia insists on a symmetrical, equal partnership not only in declarations, 
but also in practice.  
Therefore, this study has shown how socialisation can be an efficient alternative to conditionality and help to 
step up cooperation in the Road Map. The visa liberalisation process and increasing youth exchanges seem to 
be the best methods of socialisation: more people would be able to come to the EU and become supporters of 
the  shared  values;  more  visitors  to  Russia  would  provide  for  the  better  understanding  of  the  parties. 
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Furthermore, as agreed in the Road Map, joint training programmes for civil servants who are involved in the 
implementation of the Common Steps, as well as seminars, exchanges of experience and best practices, 
promote socialisation and confidence building, which is vitally needed to face security challenges and build a 
Europe without dividing lines. 
4.2  Policy Recommendations 
Bearing in mind the uneven progress in the Common Space policy areas, it is recommended that the LIBE 
Committee should undertake the following steps:  
  Monitor  the  further  implementation  of  the  EU-Russia  Readmission  Agreement  and  complete  the 
necessary procedure for and signature of the remaining Protocols. For this objective, the contacts on 
joint readmission should be established.  
  Implementation of the local border traffic regime should also be closely monitored in cooperation with 
colleagues from the Russian State Duma, Polish Sejm and Kaliningrad regional Duma.  
Special attention should be paid to areas where limited progress is observed: 
  In the framework of the dialogue on migration and asylum, the problem of asylum seekers from the 
North  Caucasus  should  be  analysed  from  all  aspects.  The  LIBE  Committee  should  follow 
developments concerning asylum seekers who are apprehended at the border as irregular migrants and 
subject to an accelerated return procedure to Russia as well as those who stay at detention camps, in 
both the member states and in Russia.  
  Give consent to the VFA once the negotiations are finalised, so that a new tool fostering mobility 
between the EU and Russia enters into force. 
  Implementation of Common Steps elements should be monitored with the aim of their timely and 
effective completion. For this purpose the relevant implementation reports should be analysed by the 
LIBE Committee. 
  The LIBE Committee should analyse possibilities for developing the five-year Russia-EU plan on the 
basis of the Russian “Rainbow-2” plan and anti-drug provisions of the report on a New Strategy for 
Afghanistan, approved by the European Parliament in December 2010. Attention should be given to 
Russia’s proposal for establishing the EU-Russia joint anti-drug agency. 
  In the framework of the Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, meetings and contacts should be 
established with the Information Commission of the Russian Federation Council, aimed at exploring 
the possibilities to create an independent supervisory authority, with a view to a quicker signature of 
the operational agreements between Russia and Europol/Eurojust.  
A number of recommendations of a procedural character can be suggested: 
  The  LIBE  Committee  should  cooperate  with  the  members  of  the  EU-Russia  Parliamentary 
Cooperation Committee to promote in its agenda issues related to EU-Russia JLS cooperation. More 
intensive cooperation in the framework of the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee would promote 
better understanding of each side’s position. Regular inter-parliamentary meetings and consultations 
help to prevent misunderstanding, soften rhetoric and continue constructive dialogue.  
  The  LIBE  Committee  should  promote  more  democratic  accountability  of  the  EU-Russia  JLS 
cooperation and pay attention to the consistency of the EU’s external action in the field of JLS and in 
particular in EU-Russia JLS relations, following the work of the different actors involved.  
  The  LIBE  Committee  should  evaluate  and  contribute  to  the  strengthening  of the rule  of  law, the 
promotion of democracy and the protection of fundamental rights not only in Russia, but also in the 
EU AFSJ, by ensuring a better evaluation of the basis upon which cooperation in JLS issues has been 
built so far. For this purpose the special provisions  on  human rights should be included  in  every 
international treaty with Russia, solely provided that both sides accept an equal obligation to respect 
them. RUSSIA AND THE COMMON SPACE ON FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE  25 
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Annex 
Table A1. Statistics regarding implementation of the Readmission Agreement 
Year  2007/since 
October 
2008  2009  2010  2011  2012/up to 
November 
Total number of 
applications 









0  0  0  2  30  10 
Total number of 
positive replies 
76  386  664  769  938  1,208 
Number of positive 
replies for third-
country nationals 
-  -  -  0  14  4 
Sources: Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation (RF FMS), Official Statistical Data, Form 1 RD, 
Readmission; RF FMS (2008), p. 72; RF FMS (2009), p. 23; RF FMS (2012), p. 132. 
 
Table A2. Readmission applications by country in 2007-2011 
Country/period  2007 (October)–2011 (March)  2011 
Persons  Persons   % 
Total (18 EU 
MS+Denmark; 
Norway) 
5,616    590 
Germany  3,227  57  246 
Norway  520  9  123 
Sweden  519  9  40 
Austria  366  6  57 
Other states  984  17.5  124 
Source: RF FMS (2012), p. 9. RUSSIA AND THE COMMON SPACE ON FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE  29 
Table A3. Chronology EU-Russia JLS cooperation under the Common Space on Freedom, Security and 
Justice 
Date  Event 
1 December 1997   Entry into force of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
19 December 2005   Russia ratified the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data  
31 May 2003   Agreement on a Common Space for Freedom, Security and Justice at the EU-Russia 
Saint Petersburg Summit  
10 May 2005   Adoption of Road Map on Freedom, Security and Justice at the EU-Russia Moscow 
Summit  
1 March 2005   The first round of Human Rights consultations was held in Brussels 
  Signature of Working Arrangement between FRONTEX and the Russian Federal 
Border Guard Service 
1 June 2007   Entry into force of the EU-Russia Readmission Agreement 
1 June 2007   Entry into force of the EU-Russia Visa Facilitation Agreement 
September 2007   Launch of visa-free dialogue  
26 October 2007   Signature  of Memorandum  of  Understanding between the Federal Service  of the 
Russian  Federation  for  Narcotics  Traffic  Control  and  the  European  Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
1 December 2009   Entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
December   Adoption of Stockholm Programme setting out EU priorities for action in the JLS 
sphere for 2010-2014 
21 October 2010   Launch of Europol-Russia negotiations on Operational Working Arrangement  
April   Launch  of  negotiations  on  amending  the  Agreement  on  the  facilitation  of  the 
issuance of visas to the citizens of the Russian Federation and the European Union 
19 May 2011   Launch of the dialogue on migration and asylum 
17 February 2011   The European Parliament adopted the Resolution on the Rule of Law in Russia 
14 December 2011   Russia and Poland signed the bilateral agreement on Local Border Traffic, which 
entered in force on 27 July 2012 
15 December 2011   Adoption of the Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel 
28 December 2011  The Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs published a report On the situation with 
Human Rights in Certain States 
11 September 2012   The European Parliament adopted the Resolution on the Political Use of Justice in 
Russia 
27 July   The bilateral agreement Russian-Polish agreement on Local Border Traffic entered 
into force 
1 December 2012   The Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs published a report On the situation with 
Human Rights in Certain States 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 30  HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA & POTEMKINA 
 
Table A4. Organisations of the persons interviewed for this study 
Institution  Date of interview 
Amnesty International  4 December 2012 
Council of the European Union  30 November 2012 
European Commission – Directorate-General for Home Affairs  8 November 2012 
European External Action Service  13 November 2012 
EU Delegation to Russia, Press and Information Office  19 October 2012 
European Parliament  27 November 2012 
Kaliningrad Oblast Duma   5 September 2012 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
Figure A1. Top-10 countries whose citizens received Russian visas (2011) 
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Figure A2. Top 20 countries for Schengen C visa applications 
 
Source: European Commission (2012), p. 12. 
 
Figure A3. Evolution of the number of Schengen visa applications 
 
Source: Source: European Commission (2012), p. 7. 32  HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA & POTEMKINA 
 
Figure A4. Visa refusal rate for the top 20 countries for C visa applications 
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